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Abstract 
This article examines the implications of the choice made by the Republic of Lakotah to rely 
on international treaty law rather than the exercise of self-determination in declaring its 
independence from the United States in 2007 and 2010. States have long expressed resistance 
towards the granting of the principle of self-determination to minorities and indigenous 
groups. States fear that granting this right would lead to groups taking action to secede from 
the state. This article considers whether state fears of secession are realistic, and whether 
there is, in fact, a credible claim to external self-determination under international law for 
indigenous groups, or whether state fears of indigenous self-determination are grounded in 
other issues.  
 
Introduction 
 
State resistance to minority and indigenous rights has been persistent and continuous over 
time.  The resistance and opposition by states has been rooted in fear of the exercise of 
collective or group rights to the detriment of the state.1 In its extreme form, the fear was that 
the exercise of a collective set of rights would lead to the evisceration of the state.2 The 
granting of collective rights to minorities was seen as something that would endanger states. 
Statist interpretation of the events that preceded and followed both World Wars were seen as 
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proving fear of the danger of collective rights as well-founded. 3 So it was that when minority 
rights instruments were approved in international law, they provided individual, not 
collective rights, and most certainly shied away from the recognition of minority groups as 
“peoples” under international law.4 As international law developed, a sort of common 
wisdom grew up that to recognise a group as a “peoples” was to grant them the legal right to 
self-determination, which would inexorably lead to the secession of that group from the state.  
 
The state allergy to the recognition of either collective rights or of groups as “peoples” is 
evident in the growth of a separate indigenous rights regime in international law. The 
International Labour Organisation Convention 169 makes a qualified use of the word 
“peoples”—and is quick to clarify that the use of that word in no way signifies a recognition 
of indigenous groups as “peoples” as having a right to self-determination nor yet a 
recognition of any indigenous group right to secede from the state through an exercise of self-
determination. The drafting of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples spanned over two decades and even then the instrument nearly fell at the last hurdle. 
A scheduled vote for approval at the UN General Assembly was delayed to address state 
fears that recognition of indigenous groups as “peoples” in the instrument would lead to their 
exercise of self-determination to secede from states. It was only after amendments were made 
to the instrument to assure that no right to secede from states was granted that a vote to 
approve the instrument carried forward. Even then, the four states that voted against approval 
of the instrument cited fears of indigenous secession from the state as part of their reason for 
opposing the Declaration. 5 
 
Shortly after the Declaration approval, in September 2007 the state fear of indigenous 
declarations of statehood became a reality. The Republic of Lakotah announced its existence 
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as a sovereign, independent state; laying claim to land that is within the borders of the United 
States.  
 
The Republic of Lakotah, however, did not base its position on the international community’s 
recognition of indigenous groups as “peoples” or any iteration of the principle of self-
determination. Instead, its claim is based entirely on international treaty law. While 
indigenous independent statehood might have been the stuff of nightmares for states in 
contemplation of indigenous rights, the reaction to the Republic of Lakotah’s declarations 
and claims of independent statehood based on a combination of inherent sovereignty and 
international treaty law have been remarkably muted.  
 
This article examines the choice made by the Republic of Lakotah to select international 
treaty law to support its claims for independent existence in international law, rather than 
self-determination in its different iterations in international law. It considers the reasons that 
might support this choice, and the consequences of these, and whether, in fact, a credible 
claim to external self-determination for an entity such as the Republic of Lakotah exists.  
 
The first section examines the claims that the Republic of Lakotah has made to statehood, the 
background of events leading up to its initial statement in 2007 and second statement in 2010.  
The second section examines the likely reasons for the Republic of Lakotah’s choice of 
international treaty law rather than other available legal doctrines for asserting statehood. It 
considers the intertwined legal doctrines of inherent sovereignty, self-determination, and state 
plenary power. The third section provides an analysis of the self-determination principle in 
current international law and whether any claim by the Republic of Lakotah to self-
determination—or of any indigenous group to external self-determination—would have a 
credible basis in contemporary international law.  
 
This article concludes that state fears of the assertion of external self-determination and 
secession from the state by indigenous groups do not take into account the modern 
international law position on the exercise of external self-determination. Secession is not 
widely available to all “peoples”, but rather available only in limited circumstances. The self-
determination limitations in the UNDRIP are not unique, but rather reflective of the contents 
of many other international instruments that provide for internal self-determination. The 
inherent sovereignty position of American indigenous groups is perhaps a unique domestic 
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positioning of indigenous groups, and one not widely available to groups outside of the 
United States.  Inherent sovereignty—as defined by the United States government through 
the use of its claimed plenary powers over indigenous groups-- is a far cry from the status of 
sovereignty that would be obtained as an independent state.  It is, in fact, difficult to 
distinguish the differences between inherent sovereignty and internal self-determination. At 
the same time an important distinction is to be drawn as to the implications of the use of self-
determination as restoring a sovereignty lost—and claims of an inherent and existing 
sovereignty which has never been extinguished.  
The Republic of Lakotah 
 
The “existence” of the Republic of Lakotah is in itself a somewhat nebulous discussion. It 
could be said to have come into being with the declaration and notification that it sent to the 
United States in 20076, with that existence underscored by another notification sent in 2010.7 
Then again, the Republic of Lakotah itself claims to have always been in existence, albeit 
known by another name at least to the United States government.  Its assertion of inherent 
sovereignty makes it impliedly a successor to the “Sioux Nations” that were parties to the 
1851 and 1868 treaties.8  The Republic of Lakotah has asserted two international law treaty 
principles as the basis and support for claims to exclusive control of territory that was 
originally granted to “the Sioux Nation” in treaties of 1851 and 1868.9 Its arguments in sum 
are that the United States has breached the treaties, and under international law, the other 
party to the treaty—the Republic of Lakotah standing in the shoes of the “Sioux Nation”—is 
therefore entitled  to not only withdraw from the treaties but to be restored to its position 
before entering into the treaties.10  No claim has been raised against the Republic of Lakotah 
not having sufficient nexus with the treaties. There is no question of treaty validity or 
enforcement—at least to some extent. The United States has made this clear in the ruling 
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from the US Supreme Court that found severe treaty breaches.11 It was willing to find that the 
breaches were compensable. But the question remains as to whether the remedy is adequate. 
It offers only monetary compensation. The “Sioux Nation” groups have all rejected the 
monetary judgment and it remains uncollected.12 Money is seen to be not only inadequate but 
wholly unsatisfactory as a form of compensation for land and the claims of treaty breaches. 
Corntassel comments on the inadequacy of state approaches to compensating for the loss of 
indigenous lands (and it should be noted that very often the United States has determined no 
compensation of any sort is due for the loss of land, even when the land had been ceded to an 
indigenous group via treaty and was taken in breach of that treaty)13: 
 
“Rather than assessing cultural loss as a strictly compensatory claim, meaningful 
restitution should be remised on paying the cost necessary to generate specific land-
based and water-based practices.”14 
 
A brief examination of the history leading up to the declarations by the Republic of Lakotah 
is necessary for understanding its claims. In 1868 the United States sent peace commissioners 
to broker treaty agreements with the “Sioux Nation”.15 The United States having come out 
the loser in battles with the indigenous groups16, in what was to become known as “Red 
Cloud’s War.”17 The United States had engaged in a three year long conflict with the Sioux 
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Nation over land in what now includes South Dakota and Montana.18 The US finally admitted 
defeat in this conflict and withdrew not only its army and forts from the contested territory, 
but ceded the land to the Sioux Nation.19 The treaty that was negotiated to settle the conflict 
provided in part: 
ARTICLE II. 
the United States now solemnly agrees that no persons, except those herein designated 
and authorized so to do, and except such officers, agents, and employees of the 
government as may be authorized to enter upon Indian reservations in discharge of 
duties enjoined by law, shall ever be permitted to pass over, settle upon, or reside in 
the territory described in this article, or in such territory as may be added to this 
reservation for the use of said Indians,  
And  
 
 ARTICLE XVI. 
The United States hereby agrees and stipulates that the country north of the North 
Platte River and east of the summits of the Big Horn mountains shall be held and 
considered to be unceded. Indian territory, and also stipulates and agrees that no 
white person or persons shall be permitted to settle upon or occupy any portion of the 
same;.20 
 
 
However, this was not to last for long, as gold was discovered in the Black Hills, land held to 
be sacred by the peoples of the Sioux Nation.21 By 1875, the United States President Ulysses 
Grant had ‘rescinded enforcement’22 of the treaty terms to keep white people out of the land 
held by the tribes under the treaty.23 The government was actively pursuing an amendment to 
the 1868 Treaty,24 and when that was not successful, attempted to procure a lease to the Black 
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Hills.25  When this did not work, the US government simply enacted a unilateral and illegal 
amendment to the treaty depriving the indigenous groups of their lands.26 Eventually the 
Great Sioux Reservation, diminished from the original lands ceded in the 1868 Fort Laramie 
Treaty, was further broken up. 27 A great deal of reservation land, even land that technically 
remained as part of the reservation lands of the Sioux Nation  ended up in the ownership of 
non-tribal members. This was not an accident, but rather, part of the government plan to 
promote the assimilation of indigenous groups into the dominant white society.  
Pommersheim explains: 
 
“...the reservations became checkerboarded with tribal, individual Indian, individual 
non-Indian and corporate ownership...  
Coordinate with the allotment and assimilation process which facilitated the loss of so 
much tribal land was the related process of diminishment. The diminishment issue 
focuses not on who owns the land, but more precisely on whether the process through 
which the federal government obtained “surplus” unalloted tribal lands for non-Indian 
homesteading resulting in a corresponding reduction of the reservation’s 
boundaries.”28 
 
In the meantime, the fact of the treaty violation was not forgotten. Indigenous groups 
repeatedly seeking redress for the treaty breach.29  After surmounting numerous hurdles and 
                                                 
25
 Ibid; Brown, above n 15, 280-284. 
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 United States v Sioux Nation of Indians, Syllabus: “...in 1876, an “agreement presented to the Sioux 
by a special Commission but only signed by 10% of the adult male Sioux population [treaty 
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27
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Reservation as Place: A South Dakota Essay’ (1989) 34 South Dakota Law Review 246, 255-256.   
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 Pommersheim, above n 27, 259.  
29
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documented treaty meeting occurred in 1887. By 1891, the Oglala had established an official treaty 
rights organization—the Oglala Council.” New Holy, above n 22, 331. The United States Supreme 
Court notes: “...the Sioux, in 1923, filed a petition with the Court of Claims alleging that the 
Government had taken the Black Hills without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth 
Amendment. This claim was dismissed by that Court in 1942...In 1946, Congress passed the Indian 
Claims Commission Act...creating a new forum to hear and determine all tribal grievances that had 
arisen previously. In 1950, counsel for the Sioux resubmitted the Black Hills claim to the Indian 
Claims Commission...” Sioux Nation v United States, 385.  
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persisting with court claims, in 1980 the United States Supreme Court heard the claims of the 
Sioux Nation about the treaty breach and awarded monetary compensation.30   
The Republic of Lakotah (ROL) has made two announcements on its existence and the nature 
of its sovereign status. The first of these announcements was made in December 2007, a few 
months after the UN General Assembly voted to approve the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.31 The second announcement was made in 2010.32 The 
second announcement set out in great detail international legal doctrines that supported the 
ROL claims to its declared boundaries and the need for the United States to adhere to the 
ROL position.33 The ROL argued that the United States had materially breached two treaties 
that the United States had entered into with the “Sioux Nation” in 1851 and 1868. This 
material breach meant that, under the Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties and 
customary international law, the ROL was entitled to withdraw from the treaties and demand 
a return to the status quo ante. In short, the ROL asserts its inherent sovereignty and its 
independent statehood.  
At first blush, this might appear to be an exercise of self-determination, of secession from a 
state and declaring a separate sovereign existence. But nowhere in either of the 
announcements from the ROL is there any reference whatsoever to the principles of self-
determination. Those who feared that indigenous groups would secede from states if granted 
recognition as ‘peoples’ in international law might have seen the ROL move as their worst 
fears come to pass. But a closer inspection of the ROL position suggests just why such an 
exercise of external self-determination was abjured in favour of the use of international treaty 
law principles. Key to this is the ROL assertion of inherent sovereignty, something that this 
article argues is at odds with a claim of a right to exercise external self-determination.  
Inherent Sovereignty and United States Congressional Plenary Power   
 
                                                 
30
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After several permutations of what the relationship between itself and indigenous groups 
should be, the United State finally seemed to settle on something akin to a ward/trusteeship 
relationship.34 This is referred to as the “plenary power” of Congress over indigenous groups 
and individuals. This power is not seen as acting to extinguish inherent sovereignty of 
indigenous groups, but diminishes the sovereignty in those areas where the United States 
government has pre-empted the exercise of indigenous authority. 35 The plenary power was 
announced in a 1903 United States Supreme Court decision, Lone Wolf v Hitchcock. 36 
Frickey explains this:  
“The Supreme Court in Lone Wolf attributed to Congress a “plenary authority” over 
Indian affairs, including the capacity to break Indian treaties at its discretion.” 37  
It is this power that Congress relies upon when invalidating the terms of treaties that the 
United States government has entered into with indigenous groups. Perhaps ironically, the 
plenary power is also used by Congress to recognise tribal authority and inherent tribal 
sovereignty. The existence and exercise of the plenary power does not deny the existence of 
indigenous sovereignty per se.  It simply tries to limit it or place controls on its exercise. But 
it is a far cry from an outright denial of sovereignty. Rather, it might be seen as the US 
government’s attempt to accommodate the existence of indigenous sovereignty whilst still in 
search of a legal doctrine that would justify the breach of treaties as legal and the taking of 
land as non-compensable.  
Felix Cohen, in his classic canon on the rights of indigenous groups comments on the 
inherent nature of indigenous sovereignty. He phrases this in terms of self-government, 
stating that: 
The right of self-government is not something granted to the Indians by any act of 
Congress. It is rather an inherent and original right of the Indian tribes, recognized by 
the courts and legislators, a right of which the Indian tribes have never been 
deprived.38 
  
                                                 
34
 See for instance, comments by Matthrew L M Fletcher, ‘ Politics, History, and Semantics: The 
Federal Recognition of Indian Tribes’ (2006) 82 North Dakota Law Review 487, 489-490.  
35
 Ibid. 
36
 187 US 553 (1903).  
37
 Philip Frickey, ‘Doctrine, Context, Institutional Relationships and Commentary: The Malaise of 
Federal Indian Law through the Lens of Lone Wolf” (2002) 38 Tulsa Law Review 5, 6.  
38
 Felix Cohen, ‘Indian Rights and the Federal Courts’ (1940) 24 Minnesota Law Review 145, 147. 
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In this, the nature of inherent tribal or indigenous sovereignty differs very little from that of 
internal self-determination.  
 Internal and External Self-Determination 
 
The principle of self-determination is clearly established as an important principle of 
international law. It is given clear expression in Article 1(2) and 55 of the UN Charter; the 
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples; the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant 
on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICSECR);39 the 1970 Friendly Relations 
Declaration40 and the OSCE Helsinki Final Act.41 Furthermore this right is firmly entrenched 
in customary international law.42 The first question to be addressed is, what does self-
determination mean? 
The 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration defined the right of self-determination as extending 
to ‘all peoples’ and: 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined 
in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, 
without external influence, their political status and to pursue their economic, social 
                                                 
39
 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, 999 U.N.T.S 171, G.A. Res. 2200A 
(XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural 
Rights art. 1, 933 U.N.T.S 3, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
40
 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations G.A Res 2625, Annex, 25 U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. (No.28), U.N. doc. A/5217, 121 (1970).  
41
 The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1st August 1975, 14 
I.L.M 1292 (Helsinki Declaration) This states: 
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their rights to self-
determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations and the relevant norms of international law including those 
relating to territorial integrity of States. 
 
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, all peoples always 
have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and as they wish, their internal and 
external political status, without external interference, and to pursue as they wish their 
political, economic, social and cultural development. 
42
 Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion) [1975] I.C.J. Rep.12, para. 56; Jure Vidmar, ‘International 
Legal Responses to Kosovo’s Declaration of Independence’, (2009) 42 Vanderbilt. Journal of 
Transnational Law 779, 807; Robert McCorquodale, ‘Self-Determination: A Human Rights 
Approach’, (1994) 43 International & Comparative Law Quarterly 857, 858.  
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and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in 
accordance with the provisions of the Charter.43  
This definition was subsequently re-iterated in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.44 Despite 
rhetoric to the contrary, there is no settled agreement on the meaning of self-determination. 
Despite the fears expressed by states during the drafting and approval of the UN Declaration 
that recognition of as “peoples” and access to the principle of self-determination meant a 
default position of the ability to indigenous groups to secede from the state, this is simply not 
so. That position is not only overly simplistic but also highly inaccurate. The various 
international instrument content on the principle of self-determination requires taking an  
approximate view of the scope of its definition. According to Professor Susanna Mancini for 
example self-determination ‘roughly’ equates to:  
‘the freedom for all peoples to decide their own political, economic and social 
regimes. It is, therefore, both a collective right of peoples to decide autonomously the 
course of their nationals life and to share power equitably, and a right of all 
individuals to participate fully in the political process.’45  
Professor Mancini’s definition provides a nuanced analysis of the concept of self-
determination taking into account both the collective and individual nature of the idea of self-
determination. For Professor Mancini the concept of self-determination recognises the 
“collective” in the sense of it providing a right for a group of “peoples” to self-determination 
and the “individual” in that the individual within the group of “peoples” has a right to 
participation in the collective right, with both facets facilitating equal and autonomous 
participation in political, economic and social regimes. Mancini’s view is underpinned by the 
individual right to participate in the political process guaranteed to all “people” under Article 
25 ICCPR.46 However, for the purposes of self-determination it is the collective right of a 
group that accounts for the doctrine. An individual whilst having his/her right to participation 
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 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations G.A Res 2625, Annex, 25 U.N. 
GAOR, Supp. (No.28), U.N. doc. A/5217, 121 (1970).  
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and the Right of Minorities to Self-Determination’, (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional 
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in the political process guaranteed under the ICCPR could not realistically claim a right to 
self-determination. Nonetheless, the guaranteed individual rights of people contained in the 
ICCPR underpin the collective rights that are enforced by the doctrine of self-determination. 
Initially the right of self-determination was applied in the colonial context becoming a legal 
norm which could override the related principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity.47 The 
process of decolonization led to the creation of over one hundred states with the principle of 
self-determination playing a central role. The importance of the principle of self-
determination was highlighted in the Namibia Opinion: 
In the domain to which the present proceedings relate, the last fifty years... have 
brought important developments. These developments leave little doubt that the 
ultimate objective of the sacred trust was the self-determination and independence of 
the peoples concerned.48 
Outside the context of colonialism, however, there has been resistance to the suggestion that 
the right self-determination might have any application, in particular on the part of the 
emerging Third World and Eastern European states. Yet, despite such resistance the idea of 
the right of self-determination being applicable outside colonialism has been fostered by a 
number of international declarations and political instruments notwithstanding any resistance 
on the part of some states.  The 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration49  and the Helsinki Final 
Act of 197550 have already been noted, added to which is also the African Charter on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights.51 Moreover, in 1988 the International Law Commission expressed the 
opinion that the principle of self-determination was of universal application.52 Therefore, that 
                                                 
47
 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Territories and Peoples G.A. Res. 1514 
(XV). December 14, 1960. GAOR 15th Sess., Supp. 16, 66. 
48
 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 [1970] I.C.J. Rep 16, 31, para. 53. 
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 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
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 The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, 1st August 1975, 14 
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CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), entered into force 21 October 1986) see Article 20.   
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international law recognises the right of all peoples to self-determination is a well-established 
principle of international law. The normative meaning of self-determination has been split 
into two—internal and external self-determination. Internal self-determination operates 
within the boundaries of existing states. In particular “as a right of the entire population of the 
State to determine its own political, economic and social destiny and to choose a 
representative government; and, equally, as a right of a defined part of the population, which 
has distinctive characteristics on the basis of race or ethnicity, to participate in the political 
life of the State, to be represented in its government and not to be discriminated against.”53 
External self-determination is an exercise that results in the secession of a group from the 
state, and the establishment of a new independent state. As discussed in the following section, 
the definition of self-determination ultimately approved in the United Nations Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was that of internal self-determination. It is not often 
recognised in the context of discussions on indigenous rights that internal self-determination 
is not a concept unique to the Declaration or to indigenous rights. Similar statements as to the 
meaning of self-determination are other law instruments. But this is rarely pointed out in 
relation to the content of the United Nations Declaration. 
The issues of indigenous self-identification and self-determination raised great concerns for 
states when the time came to vote on the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples. There is no binding or universal definition that determines who is 
“indigenous” for purposes of international law. The UNDRIP deliberately left out any 
defining criteria for determining who was “indigenous” and therefore would come under the 
auspices of the Declaration.54 This lack of definition raises state fears that groups may try to 
claim that status and thus, the right to self-determination and attempt to secede from the state.  
                                                                                                                                                        
applied much more widely. In that connection, all members of the Commission believed that the 
principles of self-determination was of universal application.’ 
53
 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of 
Kosovo (Request for Advisory Opinion) [2010] ICJ Rep, Separate Opinion of Judge Yusuf, 3 
paragraph 9. 
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 Although there is no binding and universal definition of “indigenous” at international law, 
Corntassel points out that “working definitions...offer some generally accepted guidelines for self-
identifying Indigenous peoples and nations”. 54 He references the working definition of the United 
Nations Working Group on Indigenous Populations: 
“(a)self-identification as Indigenous peoples at the individual level and accepted by the 
community as their member; (b) historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler 
societies; (c) strong link to territories and surround[ing] natural resources; (d) distinct social, 
economic, or political systems; (e) distinct language, culture and beliefs; (f) form non-
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The document had been drafted, re-drafted, negotiated and reviewed and refined through a 
very lengthy process. It was over twenty years from its inception to arrival at the floor of the 
United Nations General Assembly for a vote. But even after all of that time, the vote was 
delayed because of an eleventh hour concern raised about by African states.55 This was over 
the intertwined issue of indigenous identification56 and the principle of self-determination. It 
was only after assurances were made as well as amendments to the Declaration instrument 
that clarified that the self-determination of indigenous peoples was limited to a special 
normative meaning limited to that of internal self determination that the vote went forward on 
the floor of the General Assembly.57   
 A bloc of nations, including African nations, raised a fear that if granted recognition as 
“peoples” in the non-binding soft law Declaration that indigenous groups would use this as a 
means to secede from the state. Given as well the principle of self-identification-- which 
means that there is no defined criteria in the Declaration for determining who is indigenous—
states feared that groups would lay claim to being indigenous for the purposes of secession 
from the state—is embodied in the Declaration gave fuel to fears what it would mean to at 
long last give indigenous groups recognition as “peoples” in international law. Accordingly, 
the draft Declaration was amended to include the language of now Article 46 that made clear 
that an exercise of self-determination by indigenous peoples would not harm the territorial 
integrity of states.58 In short, right to self-determination provided for in Article 3 of the 
                                                                                                                                                        
dominant groups of society; and (g) resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral 
environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities.” 54 
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Declaration was tempered by the language of Article 46 to provide for internal self-
determination. The self-determination in the Declaration is that of ‘internal’ self-
determination, which gives rights more akin to self-governance and autonomy within the 
state boundaries. 
As the last-minute flutter of activity on Declaration content shows, states fear the exercise by 
indigenous peoples of self-determination in any of its many guises. Accordingly States feared 
that if indigenous groups were given recognition in international law as ‘peoples’59 and thus 
gained a claim to a legitimate exercise of self-determination in accordance with the principle 
in the UN Charter60 and in the joint Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Political Rights.61 Is 
this, however, a realistic fear of states? The following section considers examines whether a 
group recognised as ‘peoples’ under international law then have a right to exercise external 
self-determination. 
A right to external self-determination?  
 
 International law and international practice has provided guidance with respect to self-
determination as a right of an entire population of a state to determine its own political and 
social destiny within a state or as a defined peoples which has distinctive characteristics on 
the basis of race or ethnicity, to participate in the political life of the State, to be represented 
in its government and not to be discriminated against. These rights are to be exercised within 
the State in which the population or the ethnic or indigenous group live, and thus constitute 
internal rights of self-determination.62 Where international law provides less coherent 
guidance is where a ‘peoples’ wish to exercise a right of external self-determination that is, 
where a people/group/minority seek to secede from the metropolitan state. 
                                                                                                                                                        
or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in 
part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States. 
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In more recent times minority groups within states have sought to claim that they have a right 
to self-determination and that that self-determination entails secession.63 This is referred to as 
‘external self-determination’.64 Claims to external self-determination by a minority group are 
seen as posing a challenge to international law as well as to the metropolitan state and also to 
the wider community of states.  
Professor Dame Rosalyn Higgins suggests that the question of whether a minority group has 
a right of external self-determination requires understanding ‘the relationship between self-
determination and national unity.’65 Contemporary understandings of the normative content 
of self-determination after the decolonisation era have emphasised that there is no automatic 
right of a group to secede from the state.66 
That self-determination poses no threat to the territorial integrity of the state is stressed in the 
Friendly Declaration.67 This instrument was produced towards the end of the era of 
decolonisation, perhaps prescient of the continuing importance that the principle would have 
in international law. The Declaration’s inclusion of the principle consists of two components. 
First, it employs the principle of territorial integrity as a limit to the scope of the right of self-
determination.68 Thus, a racially or ethnically distinct group within a State, even if it qualifies 
as a peoples for the purposes of self-determination, does not have the right to unilateral 
secession simply because it wishes to create its own separate State.69 The prevailing view 
amongst States is that the availability of such a right would reduce to nothing the territorial 
sovereignty and integrity of States and would lead to interminable conflicts and chaos, as 
evidenced by the dissolution of the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. There is no 
general right under international law or international practice which entitles any ethnically or 
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racially distinct group within an existing state to claim a right to secede from the metropolitan 
state.  
Secondly, however, the Friendly Declaration may be understood to suggest that under certain 
circumstances the territorial integrity limitation on the right of self-determination will not 
arise.70 Put another way, while self-determination should normally be enjoyed and exercised 
inside the existing framework of states, are there circumstances which would exceptionally 
legitimise secession? It is clear that the wish of a group to secede from the metropolitan state 
– whether to form their own independent state or to join another state – will be at its most 
intense where their human rights have been infringed and suppressed.71 Higgins is of the 
view that minorities do not have a “right” of self-determination and in effect have no “right” 
to secession.72  
According to Professor James Crawford the key consideration is how the minority group has 
been treated by the metropolitan state:  
The question is whether... a State that does not conduct itself in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples; e.g., in the case of total 
denial to a particular group or people within the State any role in their own 
government, either through their own institutions or the general institutions of the 
state. At least it is arguable that, in extreme cases of oppression, international law 
allows remedial secession to discrete peoples within a State, and that the ‘safeguard 
clause’ in the Friendly Relations Declaration... recognize this even if indirectly.’73 
In 1998, the Supreme Court of Canada in the Reference Re Secession of Quebec case took the 
opportunity to address itself to a number of these implications, including the implications of 
the right to external self-determination. In particular, it considered whether ‘when a people is 
blocked from meaningful exercise of its right to self-determination internally, it is entitled, as 
a last resort, to exercise it by secession.’74 The Court declared that ‘international law expects 
that the right to self-determination will be exercised by the peoples within the framework of 
existing sovereign states and consistently with the maintenance of the territorial integrity of 
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those states’.75 The Court went on to say that the right of external self-determination, that is 
secession, ‘arises only in the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined 
circumstances’.76 Antonio Cassese suggests somewhat controversially that such 
circumstances might be where the group in question is subject to ‘extreme and unremitting 
persecution’ combined with a the ‘lack of any reasonable prospect for reasonable 
challenge’.77 The conclusion to be drawn from both international law and international 
practice is that there is little support for the application of self-determination as conferring the 
right of identifiable groups within a state to secede from a metropolitan state outside the 
colonial context.78  
The Republic of Lakotah:  External Self-Determination, Restored Sovereignty and 
Inherent Sovereignty  
 
This therefore is where the ROL finds itself in respect of asserting a claim on the basis of its 
right as an indigenous people to self-determination. However, within the existing 
international legal framework the right of a group recognised as “peoples” to self-
determination extends to the exercise of the right of ‘internal’ self-determination. This is 
wholly consistent with the self-determination provisions of the UNDRIP.  
However to the extent that the ROL wish to exercise the right to self-determination contained 
within the UNDRIP externally then they face the problem of neither international law or 
international practice providing any clear support for this right. At best there is an arguable 
position touch upon by the Supreme Court of Canada in its examination of self-determination 
in the Reference Re Secession of Quebec case that external self-determination is lawful  
where as Cassese suggests the group or people wishing to secede have been subject to 
‘unremitting persecution’. It would therefore be for the ROL to demonstrate the 
circumstances where this has occurred and that would seem to be a position that is difficult to 
sustain.  
The ROL did not make any statement as to why it makes no reference to the UNDRIP and so 
any analysis carries more than some speculation. It is clear from the ROL announcements 
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that the ROL does not see its position in the law different to as any other sovereign that has 
entered into treaties with another sovereign.  
Even if the ROL had made a conscious choice to abjure the Declaration as the basis for its 
independent statehood, why did it not resort to the principle and exercise of external self-
determination, absent any reference to the Declaration? Possible reasons for this can be 
gleaned from the following observations by Rupert Emerson. His commentary suggests that 
the claims of inherent—and therefore existing rather restored-- sovereignty is at odds with the 
exercise of external self-determination. Emerson remarks on the nature of external self-
determination, arguing that the act of formerly colonised groups establishing independence is 
not an exercise of secession, even though it is an exercise of self-determination:  
“If the right of secession is eliminated and the maintenance of the territorial integrity 
of states takes priority over the claims of “peoples” to establish their own separate 
political identity, the room left for self-determination in the sense of the attainment of 
independent statehood is very slight, with the great current exception of 
decolonization. It need scarcely be added that the transition from colonial status to 
independence is not regarded as secession, whether or not it is achieved through force 
of arms, but rather as the restoration of a rightful sovereignty of which the people 
have been illegitimately deprived by the colonial Power concerned.”79 
 
If colonisation meant the extinguishment of indigenous sovereignty, then grounds for a claim 
of external self-determination might be supported by external self-determination. Where a 
group claims inherent sovereignty, and the continued existence of sovereignty, external self-
determination by its very nature is at odds with this claim, as it is based upon the restoration 
of sovereignty extinguished in colonialism. This was at odds with the treaties that were 
formed with the Republic of Lakotah’s predecessor, the Sioux Nation of Indians.  
It is the nature of the exercise of self-determination as a restoration of sovereignty that stands 
at odds with the claims of the ROL to inherent and continuous sovereignty. If the exercise of 
external self-determination is seen as a restoration of something lost, then by its very nature it 
cannot be exercise alongside claims of inherent sovereignty. And claims of inherent and 
persisting sovereignty are fundamental to the nature of the treaty claims being made by ROL. 
Thus, the ROL international treaty claims as well as claims to independent statehood are 
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based in part upon the existence of inherent sovereignty that precludes the use of external 
self-determination.  
Whether that inherent sovereignty can transcend the limitations of the United States self-
proclaimed and questionably sound plenary power doctrine to permit recognition of the 
Republic of Lakotah’s claim of independent statehood is debatable. That turns on the 
question of the enforceability of the international treaty claims raised; a matter which is the 
subject of on-going research and future publication.  
 
Conclusion  
The right to exercise self-determination does not in itself mean an automatic right to secede 
from a state and establish a separate and independent state. The examination of the current 
international law position has demonstrated several important facets on the normative 
meaning of the principle self-determination. Firstly, identifying a group as a ‘peoples’ does 
not imbue them with the right to secede. Self-determination is a far more complex concept. 
Internal self-determination is a concept that is neither unique to nor that originated with the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. The concept of internal self-
determination is found in other international instruments that pre-date the UNDRIP by 
several decades. It is not new. The ability to exercise external self-determination occurs in 
only limited and prescribed circumstances. International law is concerned with the 
maintenance and stability of states, not as providing a tool for threatening that. The ability to 
exercise self-determination is an exceptional circumstance and not the rule in international 
law.   
Secondly, the question might be rightly raised then about why states had such a concern over 
the right to self-determination within the United Nations Declaration. Was this in fact a 
genuine concern borne out of ignorance of the current international law provisions on self-
determination? This, while possible, is also perhaps disingenuous.  It is difficult to fathom 
that the state machinery of the four states that opposed the UNDRIP were uniformly and 
simultaneously in ignorance of international law. Perhaps there were other reasons for the 
position that states took—a platform of rhetoric to resist indigenous rights of any sort as a 
matter of international rather than domestic law.  
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That said, it is curious that the Republic of Lakotah chose not to reference the UNDRIP at all 
in its two declarations. But upon a closer inspection, the nature of the ROL claims stand in 
conflict and opposition to the UNDRIP. The UNDRIP says that indigenous groups lack the 
ability to assert sovereign status in the form of independent statehood. But that is a matter 
hardly settled by the UNDRIP itself. A separate analysis of international law reveals a 
circumscribed ability to exercise external self-determination as a means of establishing an 
independent state. This requires a demonstration of continuing oppression or persecution—
and given the statistics cited by the ROL as to the condition of indigenous peoples of the 
Sioux Nations- this would not be an impossibility to prove. Does an indigenous acceptance of 
internal self-determination then sweep away the possibility of indigenous groups raising state 
abuse as a reason for ceding—in the event that a group would wish to secede from the 
metropolitan state? Does the acceptance of internal self-determination somehow minimise 
claims that might be raised about state abuse in any context other than indigenous secession?  
The claims of the ROL, whilst thus far largely ignored by both the international community 
and the United States, highlight several important facets about the operation self-
determination in international law. It also highlights the aim of international law to provide 
stability and consistency to state existence, not to be a means of de-stabilising it. It highlights 
the widespread misunderstanding of the exercise of self-determination as a means to secede, 
and also the limitations of the self-determination provisions within the UNDRIP.  
State unease with either internal or external self-determination is perhaps reflective of state 
unease with the idea of indigenous groups seeking redress of state violations in international 
rather than domestic forums. The decision of the Republic of Lakotah to raise its claims as 
matters of international, rather than domestic law, and outside of the provisions of the 
UNDRIP also point to the unresolved question of where indigenous claims are to be raised. 
The ROL position on this is unequivocal: it is to be a matter of international law on equal 
footing with states. Perhaps more than anything, it is this standing in international law that is 
something that states wish to see not proceed—that indigenous groups should never have the 
ability to challenge states on equal legal footing—whether the group is recognised under 
international law as a state or not.  
In trying to assess the rather murky justifications for legal positions taken and not taken, this 
much appears to be discernable. States would prefer to control indigenous issues and claims 
at a domestic level, while indigenous groups would prefer the option of international forums. 
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States will continue to resist the idea that they are not the final arbiter of indigenous claims 
and status.  
 
